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Abstract 
Energy transitions in Great Britain (GB) require public engagement and acceptance, 
but it is not clear how energy system change is to be financed. In this paper we explore public 
views on responsibility (of the government in Great Britain, energy companies and residents) 
to pay for costs associated with energy system change and personal acceptance to co tribute 
financially. Five focus groups with 6-9 participants each, were conducted in four locations 
across GB. Using thematic analysis to examine responsibility and the role of trust we 
identified three themes relating to 1) views on profits, 2) lack of transparency and 3) the 
perceived problematic relationship between energy companies and government. Participants 
assigned greater responsibility to institutional actors and did not believe that these actors 
were currently contributing sufficiently. Although participants were prepared to accept some 
additional costs because they were in favour of energy transitions, they also expressed 
distrust towards the other actors due to concerns over the profit driven energy system, lack of 
transparency and perceived close connections between the energy industry and government. 
These concerns could result in reduced public support for transitions if they remain 
unaddressed; they highlight a demand for a more equal distribution of costs and benefits and 
fairer processes in the energy system and transitions.  
Keywords: Public perception; energy transition; financing; responsibility; trust; justice 
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1. Introduction 
Calls for energy system change have been based on the need to mitigate climate 
change (IPCC, 2014) and to renew energy infrastructure (Demski et al., 2017; Department of 
Energy and Climate Change [DECC], 2016). The 2008 Climate Change Act requires an 80% 
reduction in UK greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 relative to 1990 levels (Climate Change 
Act, 2008; Foxon, 2013), although even more challenging long-term targets are in the Paris 
agreement signed in 2015 (Committee on Climate Change [CCC], 2016). Changes in the 
energy system necessary to address the above issues will require substantial public support 
(Wüstenhagen et al., 2007), especially if some additional costs such as taxes or levies on bills 
are passed on to the public (Demski et al., 2017; Vaze & Hewett, 2012). An additional 
challenge is posed by the time pressure to reduce emissions which requires an unprecedented 
pace of transition (Roberts et al., 2018). We use the term ‘public’ to describe residents from 
all backgrounds, acknowledging that this is not a homogenous category.   
Past research has shown that there is widespread public support for energy transitions 
(DECC, 2016; Vaze & Hewett, 2012), while highlighting that it is important to consider how 
transitions are situated within the larger social and political context (Demski et al., 2015; 
Demski et al., 2017; Pidgeon et al., 2014). By ‘energy transitions’ or ‘whole energy system 
change’ we mean a transformation involving energy production, distribution and use that 
enables low-carbon, reliable and affordable energy for all (see also Parkhill et al., 2013). 
Public engagement with energy transitions is dependent on multiple values ranging across 
environmental and affordability issues, justice and process fairness (Butler et al., 2013; Butler 
et al., 2015; Demski et al., 2015; Evensen et al., 2018). While there are several ways in which 
the public is implicated in energy transitions, they will likely be shouldered with some of the 
cost associated with transitions. This is an aspect of public engagement with energy 
transitions that has received very little attention to date, while current UK government policy 
assumes, simplistically, that seeking a transition at ‘least cost’ is likely to present the most 
acceptable set of solutions for society as a whole (Department for Business, Energy and 
Industrial Strategy [BEIS], 2017; Heffron & McCauley, 2017; Helm, 2017).  
Indeed, energy transitions towards more low-carbon and reliable systems will entail 
substantial costs and questions remain about how these costs will be distributed in society 
(Vaze & Hewett, 2012). However, it is important to acknowledge that these current costs are 
also long-term investments, and that costs are likely to be greater in the future if no action 
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were taken now (CCC, 2010). Nonetheless, some decisions still need to be made on how such 
costs will be distributed across society ‘now’ and in the ‘near future’. These topics are 
particularly pertinent in the context of the privatised UK energy system, with recent debates 
in politics and the media around the cost of energy (Barrett et al., 2018; Helm, 2017). Energy 
prices in particular have been a salient topic in the UK media, partly reflecting discussions 
over energy price caps (Demski et al., 2017; Vaughan, 2017). For example, average UK real 
electricity bills (for 3,800 kWh) rose between 2010-2014, during which wholesale costs of 
gas and electricity remained similar and from 2014 to 2016 bills were stable while underlying 
costs fell (Grubb & Newbery, 2018, citing BEIS, 2017 data). The Committee on Climate 
Change (2017) noted that: “Improved energy efficiency has been effective in mitigating the 
majority of bill increases that would have occurred due to price rises from 2004-2016” (p. 14, 
also see Ofgem, 2014 on price increases). Further, it is noteworthy that energy expenditure 
shares have risen since the early-2000s, especially impacting low income households who 
spend a higher proportion of their expenditure on energy compared to those with high 
incomes (Deller et al., 2018). 
Previous research on public perceptions has shown that there is significant concern 
regarding energy prices (Demski et al., 2013, 2014), but that people are supportive of using 
public money to subsidise energy programmes (Steentjes et al., 2017). Additionally, Parkhill 
et al. (2013) suggested that people do not invariably find the lowest cost options the most 
preferable, especially when they are associated with other undesirable outcomes, such as 
continued fossil fuel dependence. The authors point out that a simplistic focus on costs 
overlooks, for example, decision-making processes and (dis-)trust towards energy companies 
and government.  
Building on this, we aim to investigate issues that influence public views on 
responsibility for paying towards energy system change. We explored the following two 
research questions: (1) how, and to what extent, do people assign responsibility to various 
actors for funding energy transitions (2) and which issues shape public acceptance of 
additional transition costs? We suggest that public acceptance of cost will depend on the 
extent to which a combination of interrelated concerns are addressed regarding fair process 
and on the involvement of other actors. We stipulate, in particular, that people’s perceptions 
of, and trust in, other actors is an important aspect of this. To engage the public with 
information about different aspects of whole energy system change and existing costs, we 
employed focus groups. 
4 
 
2. Theoretical framework  
2.1. Responsibility and trust 
The UK energy system has become increasingly liberalised over the last couple of 
decades. With the shift to privatisation, responsibility for reducing costs to energy bills has 
been placed on the consumers of energy, who are expected to shop around for the best rates 
and reduce costs through efficiency measures. Whereas responsibility for energy provision 
used to lie with the state, this social contract between citizens and the state is unravelling 
(Packer, 2013; Pidgeon, 2014). Shifting responsibility and uncertainty may cause problems 
for energy transitions and public support in general, as individuals cannot address transitions 
alone. This background of privatisation also makes the UK an interesting example for 
examining the role played by the relationship between the public, government and private 
energy providers in energy transitions. Liberalisation of the energy market is not limited to 
the UK (Pollitt, 2012), for instance, electricity reforms in other countries worldwide often 
used the ‘British Model’ as an exemplar (Newbery, 2005; Thomas, 2005). The findings we 
report here may also hold wider relevance for countries where the trend towards increased 
liberalisation of energy markets i  creating new relationships and distribution of 
responsibilities between individuals, government and industry.  
As such, responsibility is a central theoretical construct we examine. Various actors 
involved in the energy system could be deemed responsible to contribute financially towards 
energy transition, such as government, energy companies and individual residents. Although 
ultimately the public pay for all of these (through taxes and bills) there are different ways of 
allocating costs. Previous research has pointed out that responsibility within current neo-
liberal governance paradigms tends to be individualised (e.g. for climate change mitigation 
[Eden, 1993; Kent, 2009; Shove, 2010]). Others have suggested that members of the public 
displace their responsibility by shifting it onto government or companies (Stoll-Kleemann et 
al., 2001; Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006). Notably, Bickerstaff et al. (2008) highlight that 
responsibility is relational, i.e. people evaluate their own responsibility and efficacy relative 
to others (see also Eden, 1993).  
Although there might be a normative expectation for government or companies to 
take responsibility for a given societal risk, simultaneously there can be a lack of confidence 
that they will take responsibility (Bickerstaff et al., 2008). The UK public is heavily reliant on 
energy companies and government to run the energy system, but previous research suggests 
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that dissatisfaction and distrust are widespread (Demski et al., 2015; Parkhill et al., 2013; 
Vaze & Hewett, 2012). For example, an Ofgem survey found that in 2013: “43 per cent of 
customers did not trust energy suppliers to be open and transparent in their dealings with 
consumers” (Ofgem, 2014, p. 10). Trust is therefore a further theoretical construct important 
in examining how the public assigns responsibility for financing energy transitions and 
whether they are willing to take on some of the cost themselves (for previous examinations of 
the role of trust in energy transitions see Bellaby, 2010; Rayner, 2010).  
We propose that the role of public trust and distrust in energy-related institutional 
actors (energy companies and government) could have a crucial influence on energy 
transitions. If there is significant public distrust this could then jeopardise the progress of 
energy transitions, particularly paying for these, because citizens might be less willing to 
contribute financially if other actors are not trusted.  
We draw on the following definition of trust proposed by Rousseau et al. (1998): 
“Trust is a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon 
positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another” (p. 395). According to 
Rousseau et al. (1998) trust can be understood as the willingness to be vulnerable under 
conditions of risk and interdependence. The willingness to make oneself vulnerable to the 
trustee thus depends on the belief that the trustee is both motivated and able to act in line with 
the interests of oneself. In the case of energy provision and transition the public could be 
considered vulnerable not by their own choosing, but by their dependency on energy for 
providing everyday services and through this on energy companies and government (Demski 
et al., 2019). Therefore, it is important to explore how the public perceive these actors and 
why they trust or do not trust them. 
Trust has been conceptualised as comprising several different aspects (Poortinga & 
Pidgeon, 2003), but two core components have increasingly gained traction. While these 
components are often referred to and defined in slightly different ways by different authors, 
they are generally denoted as (1) ‘competence’ or ‘expertness’ and (2) ‘care’ or 
‘trustworthiness’ (Hovland et al., 1953; Metlay, 1999; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003). The first 
component touches on the knowledge, skills and ability of a person or institution to achieve a 
given goal, and the second, although less clearly defined, generally concerns the perceived 
underlying intentions and motives of the other party. This implies that members of the public 
must view energy companies, government and other institutions involved in the delivery of 
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energy transitions as caring about similar goals and values to those of the general public. If 
this is not the case, distrust might ensue. Further, Frewer et al., (1996) as well as Poortinga 
and Pidgeon (2003) found ‘vested interests’ to be an important additional aspect of trust, such 
as the government being too influenced by industry. Examining the role of trust does not, 
however, mean that complete trust is desirable, rather it has been argued that some distrust 
(‘critical trust’) is important for members of the public to scrutinise actors and to hold those 
in power to account (Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003; Walls et al., 2004). Further, O’Neill (2002) 
maintained that trust only ought to be placed in the genuinely trustworthy, because 
misplacing trust can also have negative consequences.  
2.2. Procedural and distributive justice  
There are noteworthy similarities between the constituent items of the second trust 
component of ‘trustworthiness’ or ‘vested interests’ and notions discussed in energy justice 
literature (Jenkins et al., 2016), such as procedural justice (fairness in the process of decision-
making) and distributive justice (fair distribution of costs and benefits).  
With regards to procedural justice, Simcock (2016) outlines three important aspects: 
inclusion (who is present and given voice), influence (whose opinions and concerns have 
weight), and information (provision of accurate and sufficient information). Although 
Simcock (2016) draws on the case study of a wind project and we discuss energy transitions 
as a whole, there are nonetheless useful elements to draw from Simcock’s understanding of 
procedural justice. In particular, we can draw parallels between issues of procedural justice 
and the previously discussed trust literature. For example, ideas of inclusion and influence are 
implicated in Frewer et al.’s (1996) and Pidgeon and Poortinga’s (2003) notion of vested 
interests, such as who works closely together in order to defend whose interests. Simcock’s 
(2016) third aspect of ‘information’ or transparency, is similar to Metlay’s (1999) ‘openness’ 
(provision of all relevant information), which the latter author argued is crucial for trust.  
For the purpose of the present research, transparency is a particularly important 
concept because it is a prerequisite for being able to assign responsibility. Further, 
transparency is a precondition for customers to compare tariffs and switch energy suppliers, 
which they are expected to do in the UK privatised energy market. Moreover, the 
transparency of the UK energy sector has repeatedly been called into question by media 
reports of overcharging and a competition inquiry (BBC, 2013; 2014; Gosden, 2018; 
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Macalister, 2014; Moylan, 2015; The Guardian, 2016). In March 2014 an Ofgem review 
found that competition was not benefitting consumers as it should, noting a rise in total 
reported profits of ‘the Big 6’ energy suppliers (2009 – 2012) as well as increasing public 
distrust of energy suppliers (Ofgem, no date; Ofgem, 2014). Following the review, Ofgem 
referred the retail energy market to the Competition and Markets Authority for a full 
competition inquiry (Ofgem, no date). In this context transparency is a particularly relevant 
aspect of procedural justice for trustworthiness.  
The above-mentioned reports of rising profits and overcharging also call into question 
the level of distributive justice (sharing of costs and benefits [Wüstenhagen et al., 2007]). 
Similar to procedural justice, we can find parallels between distributive justice and the trust 
literature. In particular, trustworthiness might be undermined by energy companies’ current 
mandate to maximise profits, if this is perceived to be at odds with goals and values 
supported by the public. Indeed, procedural and distributive justice have been suggested to 
play a notable role in shaping views on energy transitions and for informing energy policy 
(Evensen, 2016; Gölz & Wedderhoff, 2018; Sovacool et al., 2017; Wüstenhagen et al., 2007), 
including influencing perceptions of public responsibility for and personal acceptance of 
energy transition costs (Evensen et al., 2018). It could therefore be argued that justice criteria 
are essential for the maintenance of trust, which, in turn, is important for people’s acceptance 
of responsibility and costs associated with low-carbon energy transitions. 
We therefore draw on concepts of trust, procedural and distributive justice, to 
examine people’s perceptions of responsibility for financing energy transitions and the role 
they see for government, energy companies and themselves. We stipulate that how members 
of the public perceive the process on decision making (e.g. in terms of transparency) and how 
they are treated by energy system actors, as well as the extent to which benefits and burdens 
are shared amongst actors will influence their level of trust and therefore views on who 
should pay.  
3. Method 
Focus groups 
Focus groups were employed because they facilitate nuanced and in-depth 
examination of people’s views (Pidgeon et al., 2014). Debates and counterviews can emerge 
in focus groups and give insight into diverse narratives. The present research extends 
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previous survey work (Evensen et al., 2018) to examine in more detail the conditions and 
reasons for people’s views on responsibility to pay towards energy transitions. However, the 
nuances are not covered in existing literature, as there is no previous qualitative data on this 
topic. Sovacool (2014) has noted the lack of human-centred research methods (such as focus 
groups) in energy related research, outlining the predominance of hard-science approaches 
over the use of social science methods with the latter dominated by quantitative survey 
research. The author proposed that alternative methods can reveal the multiple ways in which 
public perceptions, experience and actions interact with and shape the energy system. 
There are several reasons why we used focus groups rather than other qualitative 
research methods. First and foremost, focus groups allow for discussion and social interaction 
between participants, which is not enabled in interviews. Participants can respond to and 
challenge each other’s opinions, agree or disagree, convince one another and expose each 
other to views and ideas that people might not have had themselves, as well as generating 
joint outcomes during the focus group (Gailing & Naumann, 2018; Sovacool, Axsen & 
Sorrell, 2018). In contrast, in an interview the researcher can ask research questions and play 
devil’s advocate, but this does not spark the same level of interaction as in focus groups and 
the power dynamic between researcher and participant is different than between several 
participants. Secondly, although focus groups are in no way a naturalistic example of public 
debate, they are a closer attempt to replicating how people discuss information with each 
other and the process through which responses are formed, than is the case in interviews.   
Sample and location 
Five focus groups (between 6-9 participants each) were conducted in the four 
following cities; Cardiff in Wales, London (2 groups) and Birmingham in England, and 
Glasgow in Scotland. They took place in November and December 2016 and lasted 
approximately 2.5 hours each. Participants were recruited to represent a diverse spread in 
terms of age, gender and socio-demographic backgrounds (age range = 25 - 72 years, 15 
females, 22 males, see Appendix A). Recruitment drew on demographic and contact data that 
respondents from a previous survey conducted under this research project had provided (see 
Evensen et al, 2018)1. Due to low recruitment from the survey respondents in some cities (3 
Cardiff, 14 London, 5 Birmingham, 3 Glasgow) an external recruitment company recruited 
twelve additional participants to supplement the sample. The focus groups were held in 
                                                     
1 The broad research project consisted of a two-part survey, followed by focus groups. However, each phase was 
guided by separate research questions and this paper focused on the later exclusively.  
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meeting rooms in central hotels in each city. In recompense participants received a £60 
honorarium. 
We chose to recruit a diverse sample in terms of key demographic variables (age, 
gender, income) to gain both breadth and depth in views. Although we cannot claim 
generalisability due to the inherently small sample size, we aimed to include diversity of 
opinions, which might vary within and across different socio-economic backgrounds and life 
experiences. As such, sampling in this way provides a way to engage with as many different 
perspectives as possible, as opposed to a narrow set of perspectives that would be expected 
from a more homogenous sample. However, including people from different socio-
demographic groups also raises the question of how to deal with ensuing power dynamics due 
to differing social status and knowledge. The facilitation approach is detailed below under 
protocol and materials.  
Protocol and materials 
To begin, participants were briefly provided with background information to focus 
attention on the energy system as a whole. This included energy production, e.g. importing 
fuel, or producing from different sources such as nuclear, fossil fuels or renewables; 
transportation, i.e. grids and fuel transport; to end use, that is efficiency measures and 
reducing overall consumption from different users like businesses, factories and households. 
Next, the possibility of changes to the energy system and associated costs were introduced. 
The following potential four goals for energy transition were presented and discussed in 
terms of their relative importance; first reducing the use of fossil fuels and increasing low 
carbon energy production, second decreasing overall energy use, third ensuring a reliable 
energy supply and fourth supporting disadvantaged groups. Subsequently, participants were 
prompted on their views concerning responsibility of energy companies, government and the 
general public (including future generations) for financing energy system change and 
achieving the four goals previously discussed. After the break, participants were invited to 
focus on personal acceptance of costs associated with energy transition, such as levies on 
their energy bills. They were asked to estimate how much of their energy bill currently goes 
towards energy company profits and towards social and environmental levies. Participants 
were then provided the percentages given by Ofgem (9% and 7% respectively) and asked 
what they thought of these. Finally, participants were asked to discuss their views on the 
effects of Brexit on energy bills, but these results are not included in the present findings. The 
protocol used to guide the focus groups can be found in the supplementary material. 
10 
 
From the beginning and throughout, it was made clear that no prior knowledge of the 
energy system was needed and that we were interested in people’s experiences and opinions. 
The researchers who facilitated the focus groups had previous experience in moderating such 
research and attempted to include every participant in the discussion. Thereby, facilitators 
attempted to ensure everyone had an opportunity to provide their perspective. Expertise in 
energy matters was not expected and, upon analysis, not found to play a significant role in the 
focus group dynamics. We found that various participants disagreed and agreed across 
different topics regardless of apparent existing expertise and that participants sometimes 
questioned the approach taken by the researchers, i.e. those who could be perceived to hold 
the most power and expertise. 
Analytic approach 
All audio recordings were professionally transcribed, checked for accuracy and 
anonymised. Thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) was used to code the focus group 
transcripts imported into the software NVivo. A data driven approach was used for coding 
and analysis, so that themes were primarily constructed based on the data, as opposed to 
following a pre-existing coding scheme. Nonetheless, the analysis will have been influenced 
by the authors’ knowledge of the existing research in this field (see introduction). To begin, 
general topics, assumptions, lines of argument and disagreements were noted. All transcripts 
were completely coded into a wide range of topics, which were ordered and narrowed down 
for more in-depth examination. Coding was iterative, whereby transcripts were repeatedly 
read and themes were developed in discussion with the research team. Concretely, we applied 
thematic analysis to our focus group data by identifying a topic of discussion as a theme if it 
was relevant for answering the overarching research questions, if it emerged across several 
focus groups and if it was repeatedly discussed by different participants within a focus group. 
Rare counterviews within these topics of discussion were also included to understand 
diversity of perspectives on a given theme.  
A contextualist method guided the analysis in order to explore both how participants 
viewed and made sense of energy transition, as well as relating these views to the larger 
social context in which they are set. Braun and Clarke (2006) characterise a contexualist 
method as one that is characterised by theories of critical realism, taking into account how 
individuals make sense of their experience, as well as examining the extent to which the 
wider social context influences those experiences and meanings. For example, in our analysis 
we were interested both in how participants view energy companies, which has partly been 
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influenced by their personal experience of them, as well as understanding how these views 
are influenced by the broader social context, such as the privatised energy system. In focus 
group research this means that participants bring both their own pre-existing experiences and 
views, as well as having the opportunity to share and compare these with each other, forming 
an understanding and ideas about energy transitions in the group.  
Participants spent a similar amount of time discussing different topics across all focus 
groups and we did not notice participants avoiding topics that they were prompted on (see 
Stewart et al., 2007). We did not include non-verbal communication and body language in the 
analysis because this was beyond the scope of the analysis and our understanding of the 
specific research questions. Location of the focus group also did not appear to significantly 
influence participants’ responses. Themes presented in the findings section were identified 
across all locations. In the findings section and tables we present illustrative quotations of the 
types of statements participants made which contributed to our identification of themes.  
4. Findings 
The findings are presented in three sections - views on profits, lack of transparency, 
and perceived collusion between energy companies and government. These were identified as 
particularly important for understanding how participants assigned responsibility for 
financing energy transitions and under what circumstances they themselves were willing to 
pay towards energy transition costs. I  is important to note that, in line with previous research, 
the discussions clearly indicated strong support for energy system change (increasing low 
carbon energy, reducing energy use, ensuring energy reliability and affordability) (Parkhill et 
al., 2013; Vaze & Hewett, 2012).  
Energy companies and government were assigned primary responsibility for paying 
for energy system change, because they were seen to have the financial means and the 
structural power to do so (see Table 1 for illustrative quotes). Although participants ranked 
responsibility differently, several viewed all three (energy companies, government and the 
public) as being responsible for contributing to energy system costs. Some argued however 
that the public was already paying disproportionately because, in the end, all means of paying 
come from the public in the form of taxes or energy bills. This may be considered one source 
of distrust, because members of the public felt they were fulfilling their responsibility while 
institutional actors were not. Below we unpack in more detail how people’s perceptions of 
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energy companies and government shaped their views on responsibility and their own 
willingness to take on a share of the costs associated with energy transitions. 
Theme 1. Views on profits “I’m just not comfortable with them maintaining that 
level of profits…. if my energy bills go up”.  
Perspectives on profits were a recurring topic throughout the focus groups. 
Participants’ views on profits led them to question both energy companies’ and government’s 
motives and illustrated distrust. Two sub-themes are presented: first we examine the 
conditions under which profits were evaluated and second we explore how profits were 
conceptualised as part of a systemic issue.  
1.1 Conditions placed on profits “It depends what they do with it (profit) I suppose” 
In the instances where making profit was not rejected outright, certain conditions 
were used to judge the acceptability of profit levels. These relate to profit use, how deserved 
they are, whether they are proportionate, and affordability of energy (see Table 2 for 
illustrative quotations). The use of profits for shareholders’ dividends or directors’ salaries 
was seen as largely unacceptable, whereas reinvestment in infrastructure and innovation was 
viewed more positively. Profit use was evaluated based on the notion that making profits 
comes with a responsibility to ‘give back’. As Susie from Cardiff said “they should be using 
it (profit) more wisely and not just throwing bonuses to people and actually pay them back 
into other things”. Important was also whether the profit level was deemed as deserved or not 
considering the roles that individuals or companies play. There was however a certain level 
of distrust whether profits were in fact deserved, which often emerged in the form of 
cynicism: “Yeah, [are] they actually really working or are they out playing golf?” (Katherine, 
Cardiff).  
In contrast, Amanda’s point (Glasgow) provides a counterview that emerged less 
frequently, where deservingness was based on the higher risk, responsibility and workload 
taken. “That (9% profit per energy bill) to me is quite a low profit I think for the risks they 
take…. The hundreds of thousands of people that they must employ”. Some participants 
indicated they would be happy to pay more on their energy bills towards energy transitions, if 
profits were also reduced (see Caroline’s quote, Table 2). 
Participants also evaluated the extent to which profits were proportionate or 
disproportionate. Profits and directors’ salaries were seen as disproportionate in the context 
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of people being given advice on saving energy to reduce their bills. For example, Laura 
(Birmingham) stated:  
“It would be nice if the company directors took a bit of a cut 
though…. between ordinary people like us ‘what you should do is 
save energy, turn the thermostat down a notch, put a jumper on’ 
they tell us things like that and I really resent it when I know what 
these directors are taking home.”  
This highlights the issue of how profits relate to energy affordability. Profit levels 
were often considered unfair and unacceptable in the context of energy not being affordable 
for some people. One participant suggested that the degree of profit was almost irrelevant as 
long as energy remained affordable: “They could have 50% profit if I could afford my bill…. 
And he’s sitting there struggling to get heat, the same as my grandmother, so that again is a 
problem for me when they’re making so much money” (Freddie, London afternoon). The 
contrast between energy companies being perceived to make a lot of money, while people 
experienced fuel poverty was repeatedly judged to be problematic and unfair, speaking to 
wider systemic issues of energy provision and unequal distribution of costs and benefits 
(distributive justice).   
 1.2 Systemic nature of the profit drive “Re-nationalise it and get rid of the (vested) 
interest” 
Participants contextualised profits as one part of a more systemic issue (see Table 2 
for illustrative quotations). The privatised energy system was viewed to be based on a drive 
for profits, something seen as problematic for ensuring affordability, investment and delivery 
of energy transitions: “It’s all about big business making more profits” (Melanie, London 
afternoon). The systemic nature of the profit motive was made explicit when participants 
occasionally mentioned capitalism, for example David from Cardiff noted: “It’s the nature of 
capitalism, isn’t it?…. It doesn’t work, it should be taken over by the government…. Because 
they’re just out for profit, aren’t they? For their shareholders.”  
The profit drive was judged to occur at the expense of an ethical or socially driven 
approach based on the public interest (see Jake, Table 2). Participants were also concerned 
about extra money paid on bills towards supporting disadvantaged people not getting passed 
on by energy companies, highlighting some of the distrust participants expressed towards 
energy companies (Simon, Table 2). The profit motive was seen as a defining feature of the 
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UK energy system, which would also inhibit addressing affordability concerns even in a 
lower carbon energy system (Lewis, Table 2). Some participants expressed the view that 
energy should not be for profit at all. 
While several participants thought privatisation provided more choice, others 
preferred some intervention ranging from reforms to the current system (e.g. regulation of 
tariffs) to nationalisation. Contrary to the notion that choice reduces the cost of energy to 
customers, one participant suggested that if people saved energy, then companies would 
increase the bills: “If we save money, then they put the prices up because our energy is too 
cheap. So we don’t benefit by that really” (Adam, London afternoon).  
Those participants in favour of nationalisation viewed it as a means towards more 
reinvestment, increasing renewable energy, control and steering away from short-termism. As 
Tim from London put it:  
“But while it’s profit-driven you are going to get nowhere because in the 
short-term all people are interested in is that, they can’t see beyond 
tomorrow because as long as the share prices are up, as long as they are 
getting their dividends, what the hell do they care about wind power and 
solar power, wave power.” 
Theme 2. Lack of transparency “There’s lies, damned lies and then there’s 
statistics” 
Lack of transparency was a critical issue that characterised participants’ distrust of 
energy companies and also government, which in turn affected people’s willingness to accept 
additional costs. For example, several participants suggested that if there were more 
transparency about how profits were spent, there might also be more public understanding 
and acceptance (see Table 3 for illustrative quotations). This highlights that although 
participants were sceptical of the profit and bonus culture itself, part of the issue focused on 
not knowing how profits were being used. Information was also considered important for 
social and environmental levies as the following interaction shows: 
Lewis (London afternoon): “This is the problem, it’s transparency. If 
they told us where it (social and environmental levies) was going, I 
think most people would be happy.” 
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Paul: “It’s assuming that people are too stupid to actually be able to 
make up a decision for themselves based on the facts…. and treat 
people like idiots.”  
These quotes illustrate the role of procedural justice, as the process of communication 
and lack of information was viewed as patronising. In the following sub-themes we explore 
how participants discussed not being able to understand energy system costs and how 
information was not considered trustworthy.  
 2.1 Not understanding energy system costs “I think just looking at an energy bill 
and not fully understanding it shows there can’t be full transparency”  
Participants discussed how complexity meant that they could not understand 
wholesale prices, energy bills and tariff structures, contributing to an overall lack of 
transparency and adding to distrust. Not knowing how costs and expenses were currently 
organised made it difficult for participants to assign responsibility for who should pay more. 
As Hannah from Birmingham summed up “It’s very difficult to figure out who actually is 
paying for what”. Participants struggled to understand the discrepancy between fluctuating 
fuel prices compared to the experienced consistent increase in personal energy bills and 
questioned why energy bills did not provide clear breakdowns. Some suggested that energy 
system costs and tariff structures were purposefully complex to keep the public misinformed 
about the best tariffs and to obscure profit levels. 
Additionally, while choice was seen by some as one of the (only) benefits of a 
privatised system, it was perceived to be undermined by the lack of transparency:  
“I think the only benefit of it being privatised is the amount of 
choice…. I think with the privatisation…. it’s so complicated how 
they bill you…. that no one actually really understands it…. So it’s 
sometimes nice to have that choice, but it’s not made easy to choose 
between them anyway.” (Susie, Cardiff) 
In response another participant raised concerns over customers not being able to trust 
the information on tariffs provided by salespeople, suggesting that often customers were not 
given open and clear information (Martha, Table 3). Further, due to salespeople’s and 
companies’ perceived motives the information about tariffs was not considered trustworthy.  
2.2 Distrust of information “It’s called having a good accountant, isn’t it?”  
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Participants repeatedly expressed the view that actual profit levels were higher than 
those officially reported in order to avoid public scrutiny (Susie, Table 3). Notably, due to 
energy companies’ perceived motives, more information was not considered sufficient to 
remedy the lack of transparency, because the information itself was not considered 
trustworthy (Nathan, Table 3).  
Importantly, distrust towards information provided by Ofgem was also evident. Laura 
(Birmingham): “But why should I trust Ofgem? I just don’t believe anything anybody tells 
me.” Participants were disillusioned with Ofgem for failing to regulate and prevent energy 
companies from manipulating their profit figures, whereby Ofgem was described as a 
“toothless giant” (Jake, Table 3).  
The lack of transparency and resulting distrust of information affected views on 
paying for energy transitions. For example, energy companies contributing more money 
towards an energy transition was not sufficient, because they could simply manipulate the 
figures. Participants required transparency to be able to trace where extra levies on energy 
companies were spent. This interaction in London (evening) illustrates distrust of 
information. 
Jake : “Well a bit of constructive bookkeeping we’d never know….  It’s lack of 
transparency…. statistics, these things can be manipulated….” 
Lukas: “There’s lies, damned lies and then there’s statistics!….”  
Jake: “I don’t trust them as far as I can throw them and I don’t think anybody around 
this table does either!”  
Transparency and greater trustworthiness of information were also a prerequisite for 
participants’ willingness to contribute financially themselves: “It’s no good putting a levy on 
our bills if it’s going in the back pocket or the shareholders or the company jolly – Blackpool 
or whatever” (Jake, London evening). Similarly, another participant clearly linked the lack of 
transparency to distrust, which was sometimes mentioned explicitly, but again found 
expression through the use of cynicism (Monika, Table 3). Cynicism could be considered a 
discursive device which people use to express emotions (in this case outrage) that would 
otherwise be difficult to say (Parkhill et al., 2011). 
Theme 3. Perceived collusion between energy companies and government 
“Government and the energy companies are bad bedfellows”  
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A recurrent concern was perceived collusion between energy companies and 
government, relating to procedural justice such as who has access to and influence on 
decisions. As Joanna stated in London (evening):  
“I think there’s not only transparency on what they (government) use the money for, 
but there should be transparency particularly for the interests - they won’t increase the 
use of low carbon energy resources, if there won’t be the interest coming from the 
private company”.  
Government was not trusted as it was seen to be influenced by energy companies 
through profits and lobbying. As a consequence of suspected collusion, existing regulation by 
Ofgem was not thought to be functioning. 
“I think there’s a third party in this…. which is Ofgem don’t seem to be delivering on 
their…. transparency and…. I think the government and the energy companies are bad 
bedfellows, and Ofgem aren’t making much of a change in that” (Tony, Birmingham).  
Participants also problematised politicians’ free movement between politics and the 
private sector, suggesting that politicians had vested interests. For some the presumed 
collusion between government and energy companies called the transparency and 
trustworthiness of information into question. Additionally, the failure to adequately regulate 
was seen as allowing energy companies to work together and fix prices, undermining the 
purported benefit of competition (Jake, Lukas, Table 4). 
When asked who participants would trust to use money from energy bills to deliver on 
the various goals presented for energy system change, one participant replied:  
“Not that you actually trust them as such, but I think you definitely have to go to your 
government, because they are going to.… dictate to the energy companies how they 
behave and operate. Whether we trust them is another story” (Nathan, Glasgow).  
This statement highlights the public’s dependency on the government for regulating 
energy companies, but that the suspected collusion is perceived to interfere with this 
responsibility. Further, it shows that government is ultimately held responsible because they 
are viewed as having the competence (one of the trust dimensions) to regulate energy 
companies. 
The themes outlined above highlight some of the concerns people have regarding who 
should pay. Participants were already somewhat predisposed to taking on an even larger share 
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of the costs, because they supported various energy transition goals, but the concerns 
discussed above also need addressing: “You probably wouldn’t even mind a few more 
percent (social and environmental levies) if it generated something worthwhile, if more 
homes were insulated better” (Nathan, Glasgow).   
5. Discussion 
The reported research examined public views on responsibility of the public, 
government and energy companies for financing energy system change. In three themes 
(profits, transparency and collusion) we explored reasons for distrust towards energy 
companies and government, which influence responsibility assignment and public acceptance 
of additional costs. We infer policy recommendations based on our analysis of the focus 
group results, however these are tentative and while most participants discussed social and 
environmental levies, only some participants directly discussed other measures such as 
nationalisation and limiting profits.  
There was distrust in the energy sector because public values concerning procedural 
justice (undercut by a perceived lack of transparency and collusion) and distributive justice 
(undermined by suspected unfair profiteering) were not being met (Demski et al., 2015; Vaze 
& Hewett, 2012). The participants in our research were largely prepared to contribute more 
towards energy transition costs, because they subscribe to the goals and values associated 
with energy transitions (as was also found in previous survey research, see Evensen et al., 
2018). However, some deep reservations about other actors’ commitment to take 
responsibility and perceived unfairness in the current energy system likely need addressing to 
increase further public participation in energy transitions generally, as well as taking on 
increased costs.  
Responsibility and public willingness to contribute financially 
Bickerstaff et al. (2008) argued that responsibility is assigned based on an evaluation 
of one’s own ability to act relative to the competence of others (also see Eden, 1993). In the 
present results participants assigned greater responsibility for paying towards energy 
transitions to energy companies, government and lastly to the public because the institutional 
actors were considered to have a greater ability to implement large-scale change (i.e. 
competence, Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003) and because updating the energy system is a part of 
their role. This is in line with Evensen et al.’s (2018) findings that when energy companies 
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were perceived to have higher competence than the public, this was associated with less 
responsibility being ascribed to the public for contributing to energy transition costs.  
It is noteworthy, that the public was also held responsible, since energy transitions 
were considered to be in the public’s interest and the normatively ‘right’ course of action. 
However, in contrast to energy companies and the government, there was a strong sense that 
the public was already paying their share. Nonetheless many participants indicated their 
willingness to contribute further, albeit under certain conditions (detailed below). The notion 
of a governance trap has been advanced to conceptualise the phenomenon that the public 
assigns responsibility to government, and government (in democracies) in turn knows it is 
responsible, but feels constrained from bold action by the electoral cycle, leading to a lack of 
action on both sides (Pidgeon, 2012). The present findings suggest some nuance, whereby 
participants desired political action towards energy transitions and presented valid reasons for 
assigning responsibility to government and energy companies, while also showing further 
acceptance of shouldering part of the costs.  
Profits and distributive justice   
In the participants’ views, making profits from energy comes with a responsibility to 
give back to society. They evaluated profit use, deservedness, proportionality and overall 
affordability of energy as a whole, demonstrating conditions on which people judge profits. 
The issues raised around profits correspond to notions of distributive justice, highlighting the 
requirement to achieve a fair distribution of costs and benefits when it comes to paying for 
energy transitions (Vaze & Hewett, 2012). One element of distrust arose because the interests 
served by energy companies (increasing profits) were not seen to b  aligned with the public’s 
interests (low carbon, reliable and affordable energy access) (Demski et al., 2015). This 
discrepancy was also noted in the short-termism of profits contrasted to a desired long-term 
approach (Butler et al., 2013; Butler et al., 2015; Demski et al., 2015). Previous research has 
shown that participants’ perceived value dissimilarity with energy companies was associated 
with lower acceptance of personal costs for energy transitions (Evensen et al., 2018), 
suggesting that the profit-drive could be one impediment for people’s acceptance of costs of 
energy transitions. Some participants criticised the systemic nature of the profit drive in the 
privatised UK energy system, which was viewed as resulting in the prioritisation of profits 
over social and environmental benefits. The distrust was based on a fundamental 
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disagreement with the underlying motives and resultant organising structure, meaning that 
more systematic change might be required to build public trust.  
Lack of transparency, collusion and procedural justice  
Due to a perceived lack of transparency participants found it difficult to discern who 
was already paying for something in the energy system and felt that reported profit figures 
could not be trusted. Participants called for a greater degree of transparency, so that the flow 
of money from profits and public levies could be clearly traced (e.g. through watchdogs 
[Poortinga et al., 2004]), often placing this as a requirement before any further increases in 
levies are added to the public bill. This was linked to a demand for a more independent and 
stricter regulator who would actually hold energy companies to account. Participants neither 
trusted the information published by energy companies, nor the regulation by Ofgem, as they 
suspected actors were colluding to manipulate figures. Ofgem’s perceived failure to regulate 
the energy industry corresponds to the notion of regulatory capture, whereby regulated 
industries interfere with government agencies which are meant to control and regulate them 
(Dal Bó, 2006). 
This lack of transparency and suspected collusion sometimes undermined 
participants’ willingness to contribute financially, arguing that there was no point paying 
more towards social and environmental levies if there was no guarantee how the extra money 
would be used. Here, lack of transparency relates to the ‘information’ category of procedural 
justice, and collusion concerns ‘inclusion’ and ‘influence’ noted by Simcock (2016), all of 
which point towards the centrality of fair process for trust. It is important to note, however, 
that transparency does not necessarily translate into accountability (Fox, 2007). Even if 
participants had more transparency, their concerns over profit levels would still remain 
unaddressed. If greater public trust is to be built, the perceived imbalance of overall costs and 
benefits suggests that distributive justice concerns need taking into account as well as 
procedural justice.  
Furthermore, while Ofgem has previously attempted reforms to facilitate simpler 
choices, clearer information and fairer treatment of customers (Helm, 2017), it would appear 
that, at least until this research was conducted, these attempts have not yet been sufficient to 
address the corresponding public concerns. Our findings show a desire for clearer separation 
between the regulator and the energy companies to ensure tangible regulation, reduce 
perceived collusion and increase transparency. One such measure that could be considered in 
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line with participants’ requirements, is the price cap for customers on standard variable and 
default tariffs, currently under policy consultation (Ofgem, 2018). Policies that encourage 
uniform and fair tariffs whereby customers are automatically placed on the best rate for them 
would help to address concerns over the complexity of different tariffs. A portion of the focus 
group participants also appear to support nationalisation, which could address the more 
fundamental concerns over the profit-driven nature of the current energy system.  
The examination of perceived collusion provides a more nuanced understanding of 
distrust. This relationship could be especially problematic for trust in the UK context of 
privatisation, with increased shifting of responsibility for cost savings and energy efficiency 
from the state to the individual. These changing relationships between actors in the energy 
system and associated uncertainties could potentially negatively impact energy transition 
processes. While the present analysis examines the UK context, liberalisation is happening in 
other countries too (Pollitt, 2012; Thomas, 2005) and these findings could also be relevant to 
those cases. Future research could investigate other country contexts, as well as study the 
views of other energy system actors.  
Critical versus deep distrust  
With regards to concepts of trust, participants thought that energy companies and 
government have the competence to implement energy transitions, but were distrustful of 
their motives and interests, due to their pursuit of profits (Hovland et al., 1953; Metlay, 
1999). These findings highlight that intentions and motives are particularly relevant for the 
second component of trust (sometimes referred to as trustworthiness or care) and also 
supports the inclusion of concepts of vested interests (Frewer et al., 1996; Poortinga & 
Pidgeon, 2003). Participants’ relationship with energy related institutional actors could be 
characterised as a ‘reluctant reliance’, since they depend on energy companies and 
government to run and renew the system, but do not trust them to implement necessary 
energy system changes (Bickerstaff et al., 2008; Walls et al., 2004). 
While critical trust can be important for ensuring that institutions are held to account 
(Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003; Walls et al., 2004), the present findings seem to suggest a 
tendency towards deep public distrust of institutional actors in the energy sector. Deep 
distrust has been characterised as scepticism towards an institutions’ inte tions and to result 
in the outright rejection of output from such institutions (Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003). This is 
in line with the current results where participants were very distrustful of information and 
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actions by energy companies and Ofgem. Consequently, they may be less inclined to accept a 
share of the cost of energy transitions, if their distrust is not addressed. O’Neill (2002) has 
argued that distrust is only a symptom of a more underlying problem, whereby trust ought 
only to be placed in those who are trustworthy. For example, there are valid reasons for 
public distrust over the management of radioactive waste from commercial reactors and 
development of nuclear weapons, which previously the Department of Energy attempted to 
address through the establishment of a task force on public trust (Metlay, 1999). Hence, the 
focus should not be on merely rebuilding trust, but on addressing the origins and reasons of 
distrust. In the participants’ views the government and energy companies are not currently 
trustworthy. One way to address this is to consider the issues that participants have pointed 
out in relation to profits, transparency and collusion.  
One policy recommendation that might align with participants’ interest in a fairer 
distribution of costs could be achieved through general taxation. Barrett et al. (2018) 
examined how general taxation could contribute to funding a low carbon energy system, 
showing that it would distribute costs more proportionately to income levels, than would an 
increased levy on bills. A key point is that even though participants do not highly trust 
government, they trust government more than the energy companies, and (importantly) some 
of their distrust in government seems to be due to the collusion with the energy industry.  
Nonetheless, distrust is unlikely to be addressed through one simple policy change. 
The interconnectedness of issues such as the profit-motive and transparency means that there 
is no single factor that can help increase trust. Gaining trust requires a larger and longer-term 
shift in how energy companies and government conduct themselves, as well as actions which 
show evidence of change towards a low carbon and affordable energy system. 
It is also worth questioning whether the findings of distrust represent a more general 
societal distrust towards elites that is manifesting across different sectors in society (energy, 
transport) and across different countries. This might well be the case, however, we are 
interested in why and how this distrust manifests in the specific case of energy transitions and 
to what extent it might be problematic for these. 
Finally, there are some limitations with focus group methods that are worth noting. 
Generally, in face to face qualitative research methods, there is the possibility that 
participants provide biased responses, which they think are socially desirable, in order to 
‘please’ the researcher or other participants in the focus group (Sovacool et al., 2018). Some 
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participants are likely to have been influenced by what other participants said and therefore 
the findings are a result of group dynamics (Gailing & Naumann, 2018), rather than a 
representation of pre-existing views. However, this can also be seen as one of the benefits, 
since views are socially discussed and shared in society more generally as well. Although 
focus groups allow more in-depth exploration of participants’ perspectives (Sovacool et al., 
2018), we cannot claim to have represented all views in society. Additionally, as Gailing and 
Naumann (2018) summarise, focus groups are not an inherently participatory research 
method, since the researcher still defines the questions and moderates participants’ 
interactions. Further, in terms of our analysis, we did not carefully compare the results across 
locations and might have found location specific results if we had made this the focus of our 
analysis. 
Conclusions 
The perceived lack of distributive (e.g. issues discussed around profits) and 
procedural justice (e.g. lack of transparency and collusion between institutional actors) 
resulted in participants continually questioning energy companies’ and government’s motives 
and interests, which were not perceived to correspond with their own, resulting in pervasive 
distrust. Until distrust is dealt with, it is unlikely that participants will find taking on a larger 
share of the cost themselves acceptable, because they do not have reassurance that 
government and energy companies will also pull their weight. Moreover, participants lacked 
certainty that any extra money will actually contribute towards energy system change when 
the current profits are not perceived to be put to such use and there is little transparency to 
trace how profits and levies are currently being spent.  
The findings could be treated not as a deferral of responsibility, but as a demand for a 
fairer distribution of costs and benefits, and fairness in the process, such as addressing profit 
levels and motives, transparency and collusion. These might ultimately not only increase 
public willingness to contribute financially towards the cost of energy transition, but also 
further public engagement with energy transitions at large.  
 
 
 
24 
 
References 
Barrett, J., Owen, A., & Taylor, P. (2018). Funding a low carbon energy system: A fairer 
approach? UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC). Retrieved on 09.08.18 from: 
http://www.ukerc.ac.uk/publications/funding-a-low-carbon-energy-system.html. 
BBC (2013, 29th October). Energy boss calls for competition inquiry into market. Retrieved 
on 24.07.18 from https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-24730122  
BBC (2014, 27th March). ‘Big six’ energy firms face competition inquiry. Retrieved on 
24.07.18 from https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-26734203 
Bellaby, P. (2010). Uncertainties and risks in transitions to sustainable energy, and the part 
‘trust’ might play in managing them: A comparison with the current pension crisis. 
Energy Policy, 38, 2624-2630. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2009.05.036 
Bickerstaff, K., Simmons, P., & Pidgeon, N. (2008). Constructing responsibilities for risk: 
negotiating citizen – state relationships. Environment and Planning A, 40, 1312-1330. 
DOI:10.1068/a39150 
Braun, V. & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. Qualitative Research 
In Psychology, 3(2), 77-101. http://dx.doi.org/10.1191/1478088706qp063oa 
Butler, C., Demski, C., Parkhill, K., Pidgeon, N., & Spence, A. (2015). Public values for 
energy futures: Framing, indeterminacy and policy making. E ergy Policy, 87, 
pp.665-672. 
Butler, C., Parkhill, K.A., & Pidgeon, N. (2013). Deliberating energy transitions in the UK – 
Transforming the UK Energy System: Public Values, Attitudes and Acceptability 
(UKERC: London). 
Butler, C., Parkhill, K. A., & Pidgeon, N. (2013). Deliberating energy transitions in the UK – 
transforming the UK energy system: Public values, attitudes and acceptability. 
UKERC: London. 
Climate Change Act (2008). Retrieved on 15.02.18 from 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/27/pdfs/ukpga_20080027_en.pdf 
Committee on Climate Change (2010). The Fourth Carbon Budget – R ducing Emissions 
through the 2020s. Retrieved on 01.03.19 from 
25 
 
https://www.theccc.org.uk/publication/the-fourth-carbon-budget-reducing-emissions-
through-the-2020s-2/ 
Committee on Climate Change (2016). UK Climate Action Following the Paris Agreement. 
London. Retrieved on 18.07.18 from https://www.theccc.org.uk/publication/uk-
action-following-paris/ 
Committee on Climate Change (2017). Energy prices and bills - impacts of meeting carbon 
budgets. Retrieved on 09.08.18 from https://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/Energy-Prices-and-Bills-Committee-on-Climate-Change-
March-2017.pdf  
Dal Bó, E. (2006). Regulatory capture: A review. Oxford Review Of Economic Policy, 22(2), 
203-225. doi: 10.1093/oxrep/grj013 
Deller, D., Waddams Price, C., Errington, E., Fletcher, A., Hargreaves, T., Harker, M., 
Longhurst, N., Reader, D., & Turner, G. (2018). Fairness in Retail Energy Markets? 
Evidence from the UK. A report by the Centre for Competition Policy.  
Demski, C., Butler, C., Parkhill, K., Spence, A., & Pidgeon, N. (2015). Public values for 
energy system change. Global Environmental Change, 34, 59-69. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.06.014 
Demski, C., Evensen, D., Pidgeon, N., & Spence, A. (2017). Public prioritisation of energy 
affordability in the UK. Energy Policy, 110, 404-409. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.08.044 
Demski, C., Poortinga, W., & Pidgeon, N. (2014). Exploring public perceptions of energy 
security risks in the UK. Energy Policy, 66, 369-378. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.10.079 
Demski, C., Spence, A., & Pidgeon, N. (2013). Transforming the UK Energy System: Public 
values, attitudes and acceptability – Summary findings of a survey conducted August 
2012. UKERC: London. Retrieved on 10.08.18 from 
http://www.ukerc.ac.uk/publications/transforming-the-uk-energy-system-public-
values-attitudes-and-acceptability-summary-findings-from-a-survey-conducted-
august-2012.html 
26 
 
Demski, C., Thomas, G., Becker, S., Evensen, D., & Pidgeon, N. (2019). Acceptance of 
energy transitions and policies: Public conceptualisations of energy as a need and 
basic right in the United Kingdom. Energy Research & Social Science, 48, 33-45. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2018.09.018 
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS, 2017). The Clean Growth 
Strategy. London. Retrieved on 18.07.18 from 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachme
nt_data/file/700496/clean-growth-strategy-correction-april-2018.pdf 
Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC, 2016). Department of Energy and 
Climate Change Public Attitudes Tracker – Wave 17. Retrieved on 15.02.18 from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/602458
/PAT_wave_17_Summary_of_key_findings.pdf 
Dwyer, J. & Bidwell, D. (2018). Chains of trust: Energy justice, public engagement, and the 
first offshore wind farm in the United States. Energy Research & Social Science, 47, 
166-176.  
Eden, S. E. (1993). Individual environmental responsibility and its role in public 
environmentalism. Environment and Planning A, 25, 1743-1758. 
Evensen, D. (2016). Ethics and ‘fracking’: A review of (the limited) moral thought on shale 
gas development. WIREs Water, 3, 575-586. https://doi.org/10.1002/wat2.1152 
Evensen, D., Demski, C., Becker, S., & Pidgeon, N. (2018). The relationship between justice 
and acceptance of energy transition costs in the UK. Applied Energy, 222, 451-459. 
doi: 10.1016/j.apenergy.2018.03.165 
Fox, J. (2007). The uncertain relationship between transparency and accountability. 
Development in Practice, 17, 663-671.  
Foxon, T. (2013). Transition pathways for a UK low carbon electricity future. En rgy Policy, 
52, 10-24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.04.001 
Frewer, L. J., Howard, C., Hedderley, D., & Shepherd, R. (1996). What determines trust in 
information about food-related risks? Underlying psychological constructs. Risk 
Analysis, 16, 473-486.  
27 
 
Gailing, L. & Naumann, M. (2018). Using focus groups to study energy transitions: 
Researching or producing new social realities?. Energy Research & Social Science, 
45, 355-362. doi: 10.1016/j.erss.2018.07.004 
Gosden, E. (2018, 1st June). Energy firms ‘in collusion to avoid competing’. The Times. 
Retrieved on 24.07.18 from https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/energy-firms-in-
collusion-to-avoid-competing-sfdqg737l 
Gölz, S. & Wedderhoff, O. (2018). Explaining regional acceptance of the German energy 
transition by including trust in stakeholders and perception of fairness as socio-
institutional factors. Energy Research & Social Science, 43, 96-108. 
Grubb, M. & Newbery, D. (2018). UK Electricity Market Reform and the Energy Transition: 
Emerging Lessons. Energy Policy Research Group Working Paper. Retrieved on 
09.08.18 from https://www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/1817-
Text.pdf 
Guardian (2016, 23rd June). CMA energy market report expected to whip up storm of 
criticism. The Guardian. Retrieved on 24.07.18 from 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jun/23/cma-energy-market-report-
expected-criticism-overcharging-uk-consumers-big-six-suppliers 
Heffron, R., & McCauley, D. (2017). The concept of energy justice across the disciplines. 
Energy Policy, 105, 658-667. doi: 10.1016/j.enpol.2017.03.018 
Helm, D. (2017). Cost of energy review. Retrieved on 09.08.18 from 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachme
nt_data/file/654902/Cost_of_Energy_Review.pdf  
Hovland, C. I., Janis, I. L., & Kelley, H. H. (1953). Communication and Persuasion. 
Psychological Studies of Opinion Change. New Haven: Yale University Press.  
IPCC (2014). Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II 
and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change [Core Writing Team, R.K. Pachauri and L.A. Meyer (eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, 
Switzerland, 151 pp. 
28 
 
Jenkins, K., McCauley, D., Heffron, R., Stephan, H., & Rehner, R. (2016). Energy justice: A 
conceptual review. Energy Research & Social Science, 11, 174-182. doi: 
10.1016/j.erss.2015.10.004 
Kent, J. (2009). Individualized responsibility and climate change: ‘If climate protection 
becomes everyone’s responsibility, does it end up being no-one’s?’. Cosmopolitan 
Civil Societies: An Interdisciplinary Journal, 1(3), 132. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v1i3.1081 
Lorenzoni, I. & Pidgeon, N. (2006). Public views on climate change: European and USA 
perspectives. Climatic Change, 77, 73-95. DOI: 10.1007/s10584-006-9072-z 
Macalister, T. (2014, 20th June). Ofgem to unveil biggest ever energy sector investigation. 
The Guardian. Retrieved on 24.07.18 from 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/jun/20/ofgem-biggest-every-energy-
sector-investigation-big-six-gas-electricity 
Metlay, D. (1999). Institutional trust and confidence: A journey into a conceptual quagmire. 
In G.  Cvetkovich & R. E. Löfstedt (Eds.), Social Trust and the Management of Risk. 
London: Earthscan.  
Moylan, J. (2015, 18th February). Energy customers miss big savings, says CMA inquiry. 
BBC. Retrieved on 24.07.18 from https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-31512878 
Newbery, D. (2005). Electricity liberalisation in Britain: The quest for a satisfactory 
wholesale market design. The Energy Journal, 26, 43-70. doi: 10.5547/issn0195-
6574-ej-vol26-nosi-3 
Ofgem (no date). State of competition in the energy market assessment. Retrieved on 
24.07.18 from https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/gas/retail-market/market-review-and-
reform/implementation-cma-remedies/state-competition-energy-market-assessment 
Ofgem (2014). State of the Market Assessment. Retrieved on 24.07.18 from 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/sites/default/files/docs/2014/03/assessment_document_pu
blished_1.pdf 
Ofgem (2018). Default tariff cap: Policy consultation – overview. Retrieved on 12.07.18 from 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/publications-and-updates/default-tariff-cap-policy-
consultation-overview 
O’Neill, O. (2002). A Question of Trust. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
29 
 
Packer, G. (2013). The Unwinding: An Inner History of the New America. London: Faber and 
Faber.  
Parkhill, K.A., Demski, C., Butler, C., Spence, A., & Pidgeon, N. (2013). Transforming the 
UK Energy System: Public Values, Attitudes and Acceptability – Synthesis Report 
(UKERC: London). 
Parkhill, K. A., Henwood, K. L., Pidgeon, N. F., & Simmons, P. (2011). Laughing it off?  
Humour, affect and emotion work in communities living with nuclear risk.British 
Journal of Sociology, 62, 324-346. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-4446.2011.01367.x 
Pidgeon, N. (2012). Public understanding of, and attitudes to, climate change: UK and 
international perspectives and policy. Climate Policy, 12, S85-S106. doi: 
10.1080/14693062.2012.702982 
Pidgeon, N. (2014). Complexity, uncertainty and future risks. Journal Of Risk Research, 17, 
1269-1271. doi: 10.1080/13669877.2014.940599 
Pidgeon, N., Demski, C., Butler, C., Parkhill, K., & Spence, A. (2014). Creating a national 
citizen engagement process for energy policy. Proceedings Of The National Academy 
Of Sciences, 111(Supplement_4), 13606-13613. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1317512111 
Pollitt, M. G. (2012). The role of policy in energy transitions: Lessons from the energy 
liberalisation era. Energy Policy, 50, 128-137. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.03.004 
Poortinga, W., Bickerstaff, K., Langford, I., Niewöhner, J., & Pidgeon, N. (2004). The British 
2001 Foot and Mouth crisis: A comparative study of public risk perceptions, trust and 
beliefs about government policy in two communities. Journal Of Risk Research, 7(1), 
73-90. doi: 10.1080/1366987042000151205 
Poortinga, W. & Pidgeon, N. (2003). Exploring the dimensionality of trust in risk regulation. 
Risk Analysis, 23, 961-972. 
Rayner, S. (2010). Trust and the transformation of energy systems. Energy Policy, 38, 2617-
2623. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2009.05.035 
Roberts, C., Geels, F. W., Lockwood, M., Newell, P., Schmitz, H., Turnheim, B., & Jordan, 
A. (2018). The politics of accelerating low-carbon transitions: Towards a new 
research agenda. Energy Research & Social Science, 44, 304-311.  
30 
 
Rousseau, D. M., Sitkin, S. B., Burt, R. S., & Camerer, C. (1998). Introduction to special 
topic forum: Not so different after all: A cross-discipline view of trust. The Academy 
of Management Review, 23, 393-404.  
Shove, E. (2010). Beyond the ABC: Climate change policy and theories of social change. 
Environmental Planning A, 42, 1273-1285. doi:10.1068/a42282 
Simcock, N. (2016). Procedural justice and the implementation of community wind energy 
projects: A case study from south yorkshire, UK. Land Use Policy, 59, 467-477.  
Sovacool, B. (2014). What are we doing here? Analyzing fifteen years of energy scholarship 
and proposing a social science research agenda. E ergy Research and Social Science, 
1, 1-29, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2014.02.003. 
Sovacool, B., Axsen, J., & Sorrell, S. (2018). Promoting novelty, rigor, and style in energy 
social science: Towards codes of practice for appropriate methods and research 
design. Energy Research & Social Science, 45, 12-42. doi: 10.1016/j.erss.2018.07.007 
Sovacool, B., Burke, M., Baker, L., Kotikalapudi, C., & Wlokas, H. (2017). New frontiers 
and conceptual frameworks for energy justice. Energy Policy, 105, 677-691. doi: 
10.1016/j.enpol.2017.03.005 
Steentjes, K., Pidgeon, N., Poortinga, W., Corner, A., Arnold, A., Böhm, G., Mays, C., 
Poumadère, M., Ruddat, M., Scheer, D., Sonnberger, M., Tvinnereim, E. (2017). 
European Perceptions of Climate Change: Topline findings of a survey conducted in 
four European countries in 2016. Cardiff: Cardiff University. 
Stewart, D. W., Shamdasani, P. N., & Rook, D. W. (2007). Focus Groups: Theory and 
Practice. London, UK: Sage Publications Ltd.  
Stoll-Kleemann, S., O’Riordan, T., & Jaeger, C. (2001). The psychology of denial concerning 
climate mitigation measures: Evidence from Swiss focus groups. Global 
Environmental Change, 11(2), 107-117. doi:10.1016/s0959-3780(00)00061-3 
Thomas, S. (2005). British experience of electricity liberalisation: A model for India? 
Economic and Political Weekly, 40, 5260-5268. 
Vaughan, A. (2017). Energy bills: What’s the difference between Tory cap and Miliband 
freeze? The Guardian. Retrieved on 16.02.18 from 
https://www.theguardian.com/money/2017/apr/23/energy-prices-tory-cap-miliband-
freeze 
31 
 
Vaze, P. & Hewett, C. (2012). Who pays? Consumer attitudes to the growth of levies to fund 
environmental and social energy policy objectives. Consumer Focus. Retrieved on 
10.08.18 from https://www.bl.uk/collection-items/who-pays-consumer-attitudes-to-
the-growth-of-levies-to-fund-environmental-and-social-energy-policy-objectives 
Walls, J., Pidgeon, N., Weyman, A., & Horlick-Jones, T. (2004). Critical trust: 
Understanding lay perceptions of health and safety risk regulation. Health, Risk & 
Society, 6(2), 133-150. doi: 10.1080/1369857042000219788 
Wüstenhagen, R., Wolsink, M., & Bürer, M. (2007). Social acceptance of renewable energy 
innovation: An introduction to the concept. Energy Policy, 35(5), 2683-2691. doi: 
10.1016/j.enpol.2006.12.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32 
 
Table 1. Responsibility to contribute financially – illustrative quotations 
Participant(s) Quotation 
Laura, 
Birmingham 
Well the general public – nil…. Because we pay enough as it is and…. I just think energy 
companies could take more of the share of everything in the future, I don’t know how 
many millions of profit they make. 
Alexander, 
Birmingham 
I think it should be the government and the energy companies that should pay, without 
a doubt…. They charge us exuberant prices, so it’s high time the government acted and 
made these companies contribute to your new power station. 
Caroline, Thomas, 
Cardiff 
C: Ultimately, it comes back to the UK government every time, for responsibility as a 
whole for energy supply in the UK…. Because I can’t see how else it can be policed 
rather than at that level, the high level…. 
T: Yeah, we employ the government and the energy minister to do this. 
Susie, Cardiff I think the issue will be the general public, we already pay over the odds for it. UK 
government, like I’ve said, if they get the taxes and even introduce new taxes, that’s us 
anyway…. So it should really come from the energy companies who are making so much 
money from us anyway….  
Nathan, Glasgow Primarily the energy companies because they make the most money from it, so it’s in 
their interest for them to have the structure as good as they can…. And then the 
government, through your taxes you’ll pay and then maybe third, the public because I 
think at the end of the day…. you want a better society, you want warmer houses, less 
costs. 
Monika, London 
evening 
Well I think the energy companies are making so much money that they can stock up 
some of it instead of asking us to contribute more to their profits, they can put some of 
their profits towards it. I don’t mind paying a small amount towards it, but they are 
making such huge amounts. 
Paul, London 
afternoon 
Whichever one you choose, we’re going to pay, aren’t we?.... Well, the general public 
are going to pay one way or the other…. Either your bill is going to go up or your taxes 
are going to go up or children are going to pay (Overlapping Conversation). The money’s 
not coming from anywhere else, is it? 
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Table 2. Theme 1) Views on profits – illustrative quotations 
Participant(s) Quotation 
1.1 Conditions placed on profits  
Lindsay, Cardiff It depends what they do with it (profit) I suppose…. because if we knew that they…. 
invested into infrastructure or to help the disadvantaged…. (if) it just goes into 
shareholders’ pockets then it’s quite high because what have they done to deserve that 
9% (profit per energy bill), because we’re all paying it. 
Caroline, Cardiff As long as I knew…. the energy company profits are reducing at the same rate my bill 
is going up…. what needs to be paid then I’m all for giving an extra, but I don’t want it 
to be at the energy companies’ gain. 
Lukas, London 
evening 
I would be interested to see in actual money terms what kind of profit they actually make, 
I know it’s 9%, but 9% of what?.... The volume of everybody’s bill together, it could be 
billions…. The percentage sounds low but the actual amount of money they make…. if 
you had that, I’m sure that would be shocking. 
Nathan, Glasgow There’s also the perception that it’s (prices) going up every year, you presume that the 
profits are going up. 
1.2 Systemic nature of the profit drive 
Emilia, Glasgow Surprised…. Especially on the (9%) profits…. Because I thought their whole game was 
to make as much profit as possible for themselves. 
Martha, Cardiff So, we kind of need some more ethical investors really, who were prepared to accept a 
lot lower profit and to be happy for the money to go in the environmental and social 
levies and things. 
David, Cardiff Or we could have more government regulation, couldn’t we, controlling them.  
Simon, London 
afternoon 
Because they’re there to make a profit and as a commercial company they have to make 
a profit. They’re not going to want to give (it to) disadvantaged people. 
Simon, London 
afternoon 
If the energy was nationalised, the shareholders that get the profit are us, th taxpayers. 
Because if it’s nationalised, profit they make goes into the exchequer….  So that can be 
then used for social things and whatever infrastructure. 
Jake, London 
evening 
Because let’s face it people, these companies aren’t charities. If I invest in a company I 
want a return on my investment, however ethical or unethical that seems…. I’m not 
doing it to benefit you. 
Lukas, London 
evening 
Energy is one of those things which shouldn’t be privatised, one of the things – 
everybody needs to use it, it’s an essential everyday thing that should be government-
owned, government run, or not-for-profit. 
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Table 3. Theme 2) Lack of transparency – illustrative quotations 
Participant(s) Quotation 
2.1 Not understanding energy system costs 
Lewis, London 
afternoon 
L: This is where I think these companies have got to be more transparent. It’s what 
they’re paying their CEOs and their high managers and what they’re investing in. If 
people knew what they were investing in, we might look at it completely differently. 
But we don’t know, there’s no transparency. 
 
Adam, London 
afternoon 
It’s (different tariffs) designed to confuse and manipulate you.  
Michael, London 
evening 
I find it difficult to understand. If you get your water bill – this is what the bill is. On 
the electricity one it’s got ‘you used x kilohertz, this is converted into a plus with blah, 
blah’ and I can’t make any sense of it and I can’t understand the meter either because 
it’s one of the ones with wheels. 
Amanda, 
Birmingham 
But how much have energy bills gone up?.... And what justification do the energy 
companies give for that?... I think that’s where the transparency comes in… we just do 
not know. 
 
Thomas, Martha, 
Cardiff 
T: Who is the cheapest? Nobody ever knows. You think you’ve got the right one on the 
day, but tomorrow, it could be somebody else. You don’t know, do you? 
M: And you get a contract that you sign for two years and then, within two weeks, the 
energy prices change and you think, hang on a minute, I thought this was upposed to 
be fixed. 
Martha, Cardiff It should be a lot more open, a lot clearer and less salespeople being involved who are 
just thinking about themselves…. And you get told what’s in this contract, but you 
don’t actually see it, and you don’t see the other options. You’re having to trust and 
believe this person with part of your life, on the phone” (Martha, Cardiff). 
2.2 Distrust of information 
Susie, Cardiff And there’s obviously a lot of money that we don’t even see…. just like their profits 
and the amount of money they actually make…. We’re just told what they want us to 
hear. 
Martha, David, 
Cardiff 
M: I want to see the whole picture and not just a bit….  
D: But they don’t want you to see the whole picture, do they? 
Nathan, Glasgow If your energy company did give you that (more information), would you really trust it, 
would you be back to thinking ‘why are they telling me that?’ It’s all a bit cynical…. 
You’d always feel it was geared towards what they want you to perceive and how they 
want to be portrayed, so I think you would take it with a bit of a pinch of salt. 
35 
 
Andrew, Glasgow I want it done efficiently and I think the test of that is if the government or the energy 
companies do that, you then see the evidence that it’s done, ‘here’s a thousand houses 
that have…. lofts insulated. 
Lewis, Simon, 
London afternoon 
L: It’s called having a good accountant, isn’t it?….   
S: Who said about clever accountants? Nine per cent profits, if they’ve got an 
accountant worth his salt, he will say, “Ah, but we’ve put that money into that pot, so 
that’s cost…. Our profits are actually below 9%”, but in reality, they might be making 
25% profit…. 
 
Monika, London 
evening 
You’re told that that’s going to do that, but you never really know if it’s just going for 
profit…. I just don’t believe them…. I don’t trust them…. They need to be absolutely 
open and we need to know that that ten pounds that we are giving them is not going to 
their Christmas fund.… that it’s going for what we’re paying it for, so it needs to be 
traceable.  
Monika, Jake, 
London evening 
M: I just think they’ve fixed it, they’ve got good accountants, they get them in, make it 
look as though this is it, but really I don’t believe that, I don’t believe it. 
J: Well Ofgem is a bit of a toothless giant anyway, isn’t it?….  
M: Transparency, show me and I’ll absolutely believe it, if I can see it with my own 
eyes, then I’ll believe….  
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Table 4. Theme 3) Perceived collusion between energy companies and government – illustrative 
quotations 
Participant(s) Quotation 
David, Cardiff It’s the government, they could tell them (energy companies) what to do, but they 
won’t. Why? Because they’re lobbied. 
Melanie, London 
afternoon 
These regulators are hired by the government and often they are executives of the 
power companies. So we’re in a no-win situation. The public is.… being abused by the 
politicians and.… by the energy companies. 
Tony, 
Birmingham 
They (Ofgem) don’t seem to be regulating the industry in nearly as good a fashion that 
it needs to be invigilated to make it more transparent. 
Jake, Lukas, 
London evening 
J: They’re (energy companies) a cartel aren’t they? 
L: That’s right…. maybe the regulator is not doing their job right, maybe they should 
go audit these companies – what’s really going on. 
J: Well, there is no competition…. I believe they all sit around and say ‘let’s fix it 
within a decimal point of this, that and the other’. 
Jake, London 
evening 
Think of the government for a moment, once they are voted out, whe her they get seats 
on the boards of these bloody energy companies. 
Joanna, London 
evening 
[Government] are played by the energy companies because they have so much 
power…. there is much more trust now because they’ve got more interest in the public 
but…they are driven by wherever the profit comes from. 
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Appendix A. Demographic information for focus group participants (table reproduced from 
Demski et al., 2019). 
Location Participants 
(total) 
Males/Females 
Age range Occupations represented 
(as defined by 
participants) 
Cardiff 9 4/5 Not available Not available 
London 1 7 5/2 37-64 Unemployed, skilled 
manual, retired engineer, 
lawyer, heavy goods 
vehicle driver, sales 
promotion, manager 
London 2 7 6/1 25-71 Personal assistant, retired, 
self-employed, local 
government officer, 
electronics engineer 
Birmingham 6 2/4 40-68 Unemployed, retired, 
unemployed, retired, 
teacher 
Glasgow 8 5/3 21-72 Museum assistant, bank 
worker, retired engineer, 
housekeeper, housewife, 
ex-coalminer 
TOTAL 37 22/15 25-72  
 
 
 
 
 
 
